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Abstract
We investigate cross-country fiscal policy spillovers through the integration of
capital markets in a currency union and allow capital use in production to differ
across countries. Following empirical evidence, we assume that production exhibits
capital-skill complementarity. Using a multi-country overlapping-generations model
calibrated for 14 European Union countries, we find that output spillovers are small
with standard tax reforms but can be sizeable with large government spending
increases financed by taxes: long run output losses in shock-free countries can
amount to a quarter of the losses in countries hit by the spending shock. Conditional
and temporary relaxing of the EU debt ceiling rule could benefit the Union as a
whole.
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1 Introduction
Monetary policy is fully coordinated in part of the European Union, as 19 of its 28
members share the Euro as currency. Coordination of fiscal policy, on the other hand, is
much more limited. The 2010 public debt crisis faced by some Eurozone members and
the conditional support provided by other members re-ignited the debate on fiscal policy
coordination. The appeal of coordination depends on cross-country spillovers, which are
found to be larger when monetary policy is constrained. In this paper, we use a multi-
country general equilibrium model to investigate the size of fiscal policy spillovers in a
currency union when there is no constraint on monetary policy and find that spillovers
can be large when capital-skill complementarity in production is taken into account.
Cross-country fiscal policy spillovers have been empirically documented. Faini (2006)
finds evidence of spillovers through the interest rate channel and Beetsma, Giuliodori,
and Klaassen (2006) through the trade channel. The baseline estimates of the latter
study imply output spillovers reaching 30% in some countries: setting aside public debt
sustainability questions, a government spending hike in Germany raising domestic output
1.5% would raise output abroad between 0.06% (in Greece) and 0.45% (in Belgium).
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) also find statistically significant spillover effects
but only during recessions, not during booms.
To gain understanding in the mechanisms generating spillovers, a number of model-
based analyses have been performed using different settings. One consistent finding
is that fiscal policy spillovers are generally small, except when the zero lower bound
constrains monetary policy, in which case they can reach a 30% ratio or beyond1. In
generic terms, fiscal policy coordination can be a complement to monetary policy in a
common currency area. Mendoza and Tesar (1998) as well as Forni, Gerali, and Pisani
(2010) are two exceptions. Abstracting from the Zero Lower Bound, they find large
spillovers. However, they both assume infinitely-lived representative agents, which can
bias fiscal policy estimates (Ganelli, 2005; Botman, Laxton, Muir, and Romanov, 2006;
Kumhof and Laxton, 2013).
We investigate spillovers without the zero lower bound on monetary policy when
households have a finite life and taxes are distortionary. Beyond monetary policy inte-
gration, we take a minimal economic integration view in a world without frictions and
find, in some circumstances, large spillovers. Our finding implies that there is a rationale
for policy coordination in common currency areas, independently from monetary policy.
This motive for fiscal policy coordination complements other motivations documented
in the literature, such as the joint usage of monetary and fiscal policy for stabilization
purposes in currency unions (see e.g. Gali and Monacelli, 2008; Ferrero, 2009).
1We are restricting our attention to general equilibrium analysis with tax instruments used by gov-
ernments, all distortionary. For studies finding small spillovers away from the Zero Lower Bound, see
for instance Alessandria and Delacroix (2008), Gomes, Jacquinot, and Pisani (2012), Cogan, Taylor,
Wieland, and Wolters (2013) or Kollmann, Ratto, Roeger, in’t Veld, and Vogel (2015). For studies
finding large spillovers at the Zero Lower Bound, see for instance in’t Veld (2013) or Benes, Kumhof,
Laxton, Muir, and Mursula (2013). Studies finding small spillover at the Zero Lower Bound and large
spillovers away from it include Erceg and Lindé (2010); Erceg and Lindé (2013) as well as Blanchard,
Erceg, and Lindé (2016). Output spillovers close to 20% can also be found with lump-sum taxation
away from the Zero Lower Bound (Corsetti, Meier, and Müller, 2010).
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Concretely, we assume that capital markets are integrated across countries, that
labor markets are separated and that there are no business cycle fluctuations nor price
rigidities in a currency union. Given the key role of the capital market in spillovers, we
pay close attention to the use of capital in production2. Empirical evidence points to
capital-skill complementarity, the fact that capital is more complementary to high-skilled
than low-skilled labor (Griliches, 1969), one explanation for wage inequality variations
(Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante, 2000).
We incorporate capital-skill complementarity in a multi-country overlapping-generations
model with three skill classes, endogenous labor supply, flexible prices, distortive tax-
ation and integrated capital markets in a single currency union. The set up allows to
isolate the impact of skilled labor and capital use in production, which varies across
countries.
Depending on reforms and countries, we find either small or large spillovers. On the
one hand, standard tax reforms generate spillovers smaller than 3%, for instance when
labor income tax rates are cut 20%. On the other hand, large and temporary increases
of public spending, consistent with unusual measures put in place in Europe after the
2007 financial crisis, generate larger spillovers in some countries: if Germany was to
increase government spending by 2.5% of GDP during 5 years3 and all countries were to
use labor income taxes to keep their public debt constant, yearly average output losses
would amount to 0.59% in Germany, 0.14% in Spain and 0.07% in Finland. In this case,
the output spillover varies between 24% and 12%.
Integrated capital markets and capital-skill complementarity drive the results. An
increase of public spending in one country takes away resources from the international
capital market, crowding out private investments in all countries. Because capital is
more complementary with the most productive types of labor, provided by high-skilled
workers, capital-skill complementarity amplifies the negative impact on output. The
amplification effect is particularly strong in countries with large stocks of skilled workers,
typical in developed countries.
Further simulations also highlight the role of public debt management rules. Allowing
for a temporary increase of public debt in the countries hit by a shock, the same German
government spending increase scenario would lead to yearly average output losses of
0.54% in Germany, 0.12% in Spain and 0.06% in Finland. Under certain conditions,
the European Union as a whole might thus gain from temporarily relaxing their 60%-
of-GDP debt ceiling rule, because shocks are smoothed over time and countries, rather
than countries alone.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and its
calibration. The subsequent section provides results of the quantitative analysis. Section
4 derives policy implications while section 5 concludes.
2Our approach has similarities with Jin (2012): allowing usage of capital in production to differ across
countries, she provides a theory which can help to rationalize the direction of international capital flows.
3This increase can be compared to the financial support provided by German authorities to house-
holds and firms after the 2007 subprime crisis, which, as of 2013, amounted for the sole financial sector
to 10.8% of GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2013).
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2 Model
To quantify long-run cross-country spillover effects and potential gains from fiscal policy
coordination, we develop a multi-country computable general equilibrium model with
an integrated capital market in a currency union. We assume that only capital is freely
mobile, while labor is immobile4.
Spillover effects may be due to policy reforms, demographic changes or large one-time
economic shocks which take place in times of crisis, such as the 2007 subprime crisis or
the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis. Short-run spillover effects due to business cycle
fluctuations are not considered.
Concretely, we start from an existing single-country overlapping-generations model
routinely used for policy evaluation5 and extend it to a multi-country model following
the Buiter (1981) procedure6. The single-country model, of the Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987) tradition, builds on Jaag, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2010), which features
endogenous labor supply decisions along intensive and extensive margins as well as un-
employment, and adds a separation in three skill levels following Jaag (2009). The
resulting model is similar to the one in Berger, Davoine, Schuster, and Strohner (2016).
Because business cycle fluctuations are out of the scope of the analysis and we assume
a single composite good, the model does not have money, price rigidities or any of the
typical features of Real Business Cycle models.
We present details of the multi-country extension and the main features of the single-
country model7.
2.1 Single-country setting
Demographics: Households go through several stages a ∈ {1, . . . , 8} in their life.
A stage a lasts several time periods. After birth, households educate, then enter the
labor market and retire. Several stages a cover labor market activity, reflecting different
productivity levels (typically hump-shaped). Households face a constant, age-dependent
probability of dying 1 − γa. They differ in skills, birth date and death date8. After
they are born, they are randomly assigned one of three skill levels, low, medium or high,
i ∈ {l,m, h}. Medium and high skills are acquired through further education, which has
no cost but delays access to the labor market. Education for medium skills takes place
in stage a = 1, for high skills in stages a ∈ {1, 2}. Retirement is defined exogenously and
4Clemens (2011) wonders why migration flows are so small, given the large welfare gains that model
simulations exhibit.
5See for instance CPB et al. (2013).
6The extension has been used in a number of studies, including Persson (1985), Frenkel and Razin
(1986), Boersch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2006) and Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2005). It is
consistent with intertemporal approaches to current account analyses (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995).
7Details on the single-country model are contained for instance in the technical appendix of Berger,
Davoine, Schuster, and Strohner (2016).
8In the implementation, households also differ in the the speed at which they go through the stages
of the life cycle, which reflects differences in appetite for effort, luck or other unobserved attributes, a
generalization of Gertler (1999) used in Jaag, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2010). For ease of presenta-
tion, we ignore this model feature. The complexity arises in numerical simulations. Aggregation results,
presented in the on-line appendix of Berger, Davoine, Schuster, and Strohner (2016), help to deal with
it.
4
participate? how hard to
search?
how many
hours of
work?
yes
yes
no
no
not very
hard
very hard
manynot many
get hour dependent after
tax wage
get
unemployment
benefits
get welfare
benefits
matching
technology
decides
whether a
job is found
Figure 1: Sequence of households decisions related to the labor market
happens some time during stage aR = 5. Stages a ∈ {6, 7, 8} are full retirement stages
but with different probabilities of dying 1 − γa, to better replicate the empirical age
structure of the population. As in Blanchard (1985), a reverse life insurance allocates
assets at death9.
Labor market: After education, households can enter the labor market. They choose
whether to participate or not (at a rate δa,i ∈ [0, 1], which represents the number of
time periods of the life-cycle stage with participation). The labor market is imperfect,
leading to unemployment. Households who join the labor market start unemployed.
Further, households who have a job may be hit by idiosyncratic unemployment shocks
with probability 1 − εa,i in each time period. Depending on search efforts, a job may
or may not be found. If unemployed, households choose job search efforts (sa,i ≥ 0).
If they have a job, they decide how many hours to work (la,i ≥ 0). Being spared the
unemployment shock leads to rents, which are bargained with firms to define the wage,
building on the static search and matching setting of Boone and Bovenberg (2002).
As in Jaag, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2010), non-participation in life-cycle aR is
interpreted as retirement. The sequence of households decisions related to the labor
market is summarized in figure 1.
Conditional on labor market participation and employment, gross labor income
equals
ya,ilab = l
a,i · θa,i · wi,
where θa,i is an exogenous age-productivity profile calibrated with micro-data and wi is
the bargained wage per efficiency unit, assuming separate labor markets for each skill
class.
9We use an implementation where the average durations of stay in each life-cycle stage correspond to
ages 15-19, 20-24, 25-39, 40-54, 55-69, 70-79, 80-84 and 85+. We later use the words “ life-cycle stage”
and “age group” interchangeably.
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Household maximization: Households make labor decisions
(
δa,i, sa,i, la,i
)
and con-
sumption decisions Ca,i to maximize their expected life-time utility V 0,it , where V
a,i
t is
the expected remaining life-time utility of a household in life-cycle stage a with skill
level i at time t. Preferences are expressed in recursive fashion and restrict households
to being risk neutral with respect to variations in income but allow for an arbitrary
intertemporal elasticity of substitution:
V a,it = max
[(
Qa,it
)ρ
+ γaβ
(
GV a,it+1
)ρ]1/ρ
,
where ρ defines the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1/(1 − ρ), β is a time dis-
counting factor, Qa,it is effort-adjusted consumption, G = 1 + g is the gross factor of
growth by which the model is detrended.
Labor market activity generates disutility. Effort-adjusted consumption Qa,i cap-
tures the utility cost of labor market activity expressed in goods equivalent terms, with
Qa,i = Ca,i − ϕ¯a,i (δa,i, sa,i, la,i) ,
and ϕ¯a,i a convex increasing function in all its arguments. Specifically,
ϕ¯a,i = δa,i
[(
1− ua,i)ϕL,i (la,i)+ (1− εa,i)ϕS,i (sa,i)] +
ϕP,i
(
δa,i
) − (1− δa,i + δa,iua,i)ha,i,
where ua,i ∈ [0, 1] represents the fraction of time in unemployment, ha,i is the value of
home production if the household is not working, ϕL,i captures the disutility of working,
ϕP,i the disutility of participation and ϕS,i the disutility of job search efforts.
Given the Blanchard (1985) insurance, the budget constraint of households is:
Gγa,iAa,it+1 = Rt+1
(
Aa,it + y
a,i
t − Ca,it
)
,
where Aa,i represent assets, ya,i net income flows and R = 1 + r the gross interest rate.
Social security: Before retirement, non-participants receive (net) welfare benefits
yanonpar while unemployed workers receive (gross) unemployment benefits ba,i = bi · ya,ilab,
where bi is the skill-dependent replacement rate. After retirement, households re-
ceive (net) pension benefits ya,ipens = νaP a,i + P a0 , where P a0 is a flat part, P a,i rep-
resents acquired pension rights and νa is a conversion factor between pension rights and
pension payments. Pension rights accumulate with labor earnings, following P a,it+1 =
δa,it
(
1− ua,it
)
ya,ilab,t + P
a,i
t .
Taking labor income taxes and social security contributions τa,it into account and
assuming that each labor market state (i.e. non-participation, unemployment and em-
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ployment) is visited in each time period10, net household income amounts to:
ya,i =

(
1− τa,i) δa,i [(1− ua,i) ya,ilab + ua,iba,i]+ (1− δa,i) yanonpar if a < aR,(
1− τa,i) δa,i [(1− ua,i) ya,ilab + ua,iba,i]+ (1− δa,i) ya,ipens if a = aR,
ya,ipens if a > aR.
Production: Production is made by a competitive representative firm taking input
prices as given, namely wage rates, the interest rate and the price of the output good,
which serves as numeraire. Changes in the production process are costly variations in
the capital stock, and are subject to convex capital adjustment costs, following Hayashi
(1982).
The production function is linear homogenous:
Yt = F
Y
(
Kt, L
D,i=1
t , L
D,i=2
t , L
D,i=3
t
)
.
The labor inputs LD,it from different skill classes are not perfect substitutes. Con-
sistent with empirical evidence (Griliches, 1969), we assume that high skill labor and
capital are more complementary than low skill labor and capital and use a nested CES-
specification F Y from Jaag (2009).
Firms make investment It and hiring decisions to maximize the flow of dividends they
can generate. Formally, the firm maximizes its end of period value W , which equals the
stream of discounted dividend payments χ:
Wt = W (Kt) = max
It,L
D,i
t
[
χt +
GW (Kt+1)
Rt+1
]
,
s.t. χt = Yt − It − J (It,Kt)−
∑
i
(1 + τF,a)witL
D,i
t ,
GKt+1 =
(
1− δK)Kt + It,
where J (·) denotes the adjustment costs and τF,a the firms social security contribution
rate. Labor demands are pinned down by the marginal products and the labor costs,
which consist of wage and contribution rates, i.e. YLD,i = (1+τF,a)wi. Given an interest
rate, investment is defined so that the return on financial investments (the interest rate)
equals the marginal cost of investment (Tobin’s q), which depends on the marginal
product of capital, net of capital adjustment costs and depreciation11.
Government: Government provides welfare benefits, unemployment insurance, pay-
as-you-go pensions and investment subsidies. State expenditures also include public
consumption, long-term care and health expenditures, all defined exogenously in per
capita terms and generating no utility.
10The assumption follows Jaag, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2010).
11In steady-state, the capital stock is stable so that there are no capital adjustment costs. In this
case, investment satisfies the standard condition where the interest rate equals the marginal product of
capital net of depreciation, r = FYK − δK .
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To finance expenditures, the government collects consumption taxes, labor and cap-
ital income taxes, profit taxes, firm and worker social security contributions. The gov-
ernment can borrow on the capital market (with or without premium on the interest
rate) to finance public debt, to meet some exogenously defined target (most of the time
kept constant in simulations).
Single-country equilibrium: In a single-country setting, we assume that the gross
interest rate Rt+1 = 1+rt+1 is exogenously defined, as for small open economies. Savings
can be invested in firms, government debt and foreign assets. Assuming no arbitrage,
the net returns on these three types of assets are the same and equal to the interest rate
rt+1. The goods market then clears because of trade with the rest of the world:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + TBt,
where Ct is the aggregate private consumption12, Gt is government expenditure and
TBt is the trade balance. Holding of foreign assets by domestic households evolves with
changes in the trade balance:
DFt+1 = Rt+1
(
DFt + TBt
)
.
Private household assets At are invested in the domestic representative firm Wt,
government debt DGt and foreign assets DFt , so that the asset market clearing condition
is satisfied:
At = Wt +D
G
t +D
F
t .
2.2 Extension to a multi-country setting
We follow Boersch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2006), an extension of the two-country
Buiter (1981) procedure to any number of countries and capital adjustment costs. We
assume that labor is immobile, that capital is perfectly mobile and that all countries
belong to a currency union and produce the same composite good. The interest rate is
no longer exogenous, but endogenous.
Equilibrium: Under these assumptions, the equilibrium interest rate must be the
same in all countries. The intuition is as follows. Assume there is an arbitrage opportu-
nity. Investors in the low interest rate country start to invest in the high interest rate
country. The capital stock in the first country declines, increasing the marginal product
of capital and thus the interest rate in that country. The opposite happens in the second
country. This continues until an equilibrium is reached where the two interest rates are
identical.
As a whole, the set of countries is a closed economy, where the interest rate adjusts
so that the goods market clear. The resulting equilibrium interest rate is thus the unique
12So, Ct =
∑
i
∑
aN
a,i
t C
a,i
t where N
a,i
t is the number of households alive at time t, member of age
group a and skill group i. Other households-related aggregate variables are defined in a similar fashion,
including aggregate financial assets At.
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value such that the goods market clear over all countries. Formally, considerM countries
indexed by j ∈ {1, ...,M}. Assume that terms of change are fixed and that each variables
are normalized so that the numeraire value, after currency-exchange corrections, is the
same in all countries. The interest rate is then the unique value such that∑
j∈{1,...,M}
TBj,t = 0.
Rest of the world: We do not consider all countries in the world but restrict policy
analysis to a smaller subset13, too small to be isolated from the world capital markets.
Consistent with empirical evidence, the goods market, as a whole, will not clear over this
subset. We thus consider a large synthetic Rest-of-the-world country (or a small group
of Rest-of-the-world countries), which will account for trade with the rest of the world.
The goods market will clear over all countries which are either part of the subset, or
one of the Rest-of-the-world countries. Compared to a case without a Rest-of-the-world
country, the adjustment of the equilibrium interest rate is dampened. This reflects access
of all countries to the world capital market.
2.3 Calibration
The basis for the multi-country model is a single country model calibrated for 14 Euro-
pean countries used for policy evaluation. The calibration of the multi-country model
is thus inherited from the single country models, with the exception of the Rest-of-the-
world country. We first summarize the calibration part which is inherited and then
provide details for the calibration of the Rest-of-the-world country.
Where available, we take consensual empirical estimates from the literature. The
equilibrium interest rate is 5%. In crisis time and over the long run, we assume that
public debt is a safe asset issued in nominal terms, which are not growing either with
inflation nor productivity growth, resulting in a 4 percentage points discount on the
price of public debt. Production function specifications are adopted from Jaag (2009).
Labor supply elasticities are derived from Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2007)
and productivity profiles from Mincer wage regressions on EU-SILC microdata. Average
participation rates, unemployment rates and working hours per age and skill classes are
computed from LFS and EU-SILC datasets. Parameters for institutions are derived
using the European Commission MISSOC database and OECD’s Tax-Benefit model.
Intervivo transfer parameters are calculated to generate life-cycle consumption profiles
in line with empirical evidence.
To be able to reflect large economic differences between countries to some extent
without including many single countries, we model and calibrate a North rest-of-the-
13In the implementation, the subset contains 14 countries member of the European Union, namely
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic*, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands,
Poland*, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden* and the UK*. In this list, stars identify the four countries whose
currency is neither the Euro nor pegged to the Euro, and thus do not meet our assumption of fixed
exchange rates. We keep these countries in the list to have broader diversity. In reality, exchange
rate variations absorb some of the country-specific shocks, reducing the size of cross-country spillovers
for these four countries, ceteris paribus. Our quantitative analysis illustrates for these countries some
consequences of joining the Eurozone.
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world country (NROW) and a South rest-of-the-world country (SROW). While we do
not model impacts outside the EU, we capture the impact of forces coming from outside
of the EU, in line with our objective. We choose to aggregate Canada, Japan and the
USA to form the stylized NROW country while we choose Brazil, China and India to
form the SROW country14.
The calibration process rests on macro- and micro-level data, either as direct inputs
or as calibration targets. Macro-level data is in general available for all six countries
forming the NROW and SROW, in data sources which include the ILO, the OECD, the
UNESCO and the World Bank.
Micro-level data on the other hand is not available for all of the six countries. For the
sake of consistency, we ignore micro-level data specific to Rest-of-the-world countries.
We follow instead a three step approach. First, for each of the six Rest-of-the-world
country, we identify a twin country (or a set of countries) from our sample of 14 cali-
brated countries whose demographic, economic and policy characteristics are the closest.
Second, we use the micro-level data inputs for this twin country in the calibration pro-
cess of the NROW and SROW. Third, we make stylized corrections to the resulting
calibration outcome where there are documented differences.
This approach results in using micro-level calibration inputs from the UK for Canada,
Japan and the USA and an average of calibration inputs from the Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia and Poland for Brazil, China and India. The most important stylized corrections
are proportional adjustments to the participation and unemployment rates by age and
skill classes to match the aggregate participation and unemployment rates15.
3 Quantitative analysis
In this section we perform simulations with the multi-country overlapping-generations
model to analyze cross-country fiscal policy spillovers when production exhibits capital-
skill complementarity. When one large country performs a reform, we quantify out-
put spillovers on the remaining thirteen countries included in our scope. We find that
spillovers differ by country and investigate sources for the differences. A summary of
findings ends the section.
3.1 Cross-country fiscal policy spillovers
We perform two realistic policy reforms in Germany, the largest country in our sample,
and quantify spillovers on other countries, taking output variations as our core measure
of aggregate economic activity. The first reform consists of a 20% labor income tax cut
financed by an increase in consumption taxes (a so-called fiscal devaluation), keeping
public debt constant. The extent of the tax cut corresponds to standard policy reforms
in normal times.
By contrast, we consider in the second reform drastic measures which are only applied
in crisis times. As Corsetti, Meier, and Müller (2012) have shown empirically, domestic
14With these choices we are capturing close to 60% of the actual real world GDP and five of the eleven
most important trade partners of the EU, together reflecting more than 40% of total trade of the EU.
15Further details on the calibration of the Rest-of-the-world countries are contained in appendix A.
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fiscal multipliers are larger during financial crises. We thus conjecture larger cross-
country spillover effects during crises. According to the International Monetary Fund
(2013), the public support provided by German authorities to its financial sector after
the 2007 subprime crisis amounted to 10.8% of GDP. Taking into account that other
sectors may have benefited from public support too, we consider public expenditures
increases of 2.5% of GDP during 5 years to support recovery efforts of private agents in
a pure balance sheet fashion. The crisis is financial, without any damage to production
capacity. We investigate the long-term consequences of the private sector bailout after
the crisis is finished. Whether of own decision or because of external pressure, we assume
in this subsection that German authorities keep their public debt constant at all times,
thanks to an increase in labor income taxes. Another treatment of public debt will be
analyzed in subsection 4.1.
There are no fiscal policy reforms in other countries, except a passive adjustment of
consumption taxes (first reform) or labor income taxes (second reform) to keep public
debt constant. Table 1 provides a selection of results for the first reform while table 2
provides a selection for the second reform16. We discuss each reform in turn.
DE ES GDP Spillover %
1 FSS 1 FSS 1 FSS
Macroeconomics
GDP (%) 0.13 0.43 0.003 0.008 2.4 1.9
Investment (%) 0.87 0.49 0.007 0.016
Capital Stock (%) 0.00 0.49 0.000 0.016
Consumption (%) -0.27 0.72 0.024 -0.015
Trade Balance (%) 0.13 -0.09 -0.011 0.011
Interest Rate (%) 0.00 -0.04 0.000 -0.035
Labor Market
Participation (pp) 0.00 0.04 0.001 0.001
Hours Worked (%) 0.03 0.07 0.001 0.001
Unemployment (pp) -0.14 -0.19 -0.001 -0.002
Gross Wage Rate (%) -0.40 -0.28 -0.003 0.011
Net Wage Rate (%) 3.30 3.47 -0.003 0.010
Public Finance
Public Debt (%) - - - -
Consumption Tax (pp) 0.03 0.02 -0.000 0.000
Worker Labor Tax (pp) -0.02 -0.02 - -
Legend: 1 = year of impact, FSS = Final Steady State, (%) = changes in percentage from
initial steady state, (pp) = changes in percentage points from initial steady state, Tax =
average tax rates over all age and skill groups, GDP Spillover %= percentage change in GDP
(%) in ES compared to change in GDP (%) in DE.
Table 1: Labor tax cut in Germany financed by consumption taxes
Outcomes of first reform (moderate labor tax cut)
Table 1 displays macroeconomic, labor market and public finance impacts for the reform
16Appendix B provides spillover effects for all reforms considered in this paper for all countries.
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country, Germany, and the country where spillovers are largest, Spain. The table shows
that the output spillovers are small, on impact (GDP increases in Spain 2.4% of the
increase in Germany) and over the long run (1.9%) when Germany reduces labor income
taxes by 20% and finance it with an increase in consumption taxes.
The reason for the spillovers is the integrated capital market. On impact, the tax cut
in Germany stimulates domestic labor supply (e.g. -0.14 percentage points unemploy-
ment) and increases production (+0.13%). However, the increase in the consumption
tax reduce consumption not only from active households, but also retired households.
Aggregate consumption thus drops (-0.27%), which, combined with higher production,
increases the demand for savings on the international capital market, materialized by
an increase in the trade balance (+0.13%). Spain invests and consumes part of the ad-
ditional capital market liquidity, which increases the consumption tax base and allows
the Spanish government to reduce its consumption tax rate while keeping its public debt
constant, which stimulates local labor supply and production (+0.003% on impact).
The magnitude of the spillover remains small, however (2.4% on impact and 1.9%
over the long run). There are two contributing factors. First, the reform is of relatively
small magnitude, so that German investors are able to absorb domestically a large part
of the savings shock (investment increases 0.87%). Second, the liquidity increase in the
international capital market benefits not only Spain, but the other 13 countries and the
rest of the world as well.
DE ES PL
7 Avg 7 Avg Spill % 7 Avg Spill %
Macroeconomics
GDP (%) -0.45 -0.59 -0.20 -0.14 24.4 -0.09 -0.06 10.0
Investment (%) 0.03 -0.20 -0.05
Capital Stock (%) -0.52 -0.33 -0.20
Consumption (%) -1.69 -0.10 -0.03
Trade Balance (%) 0.67 -0.11 -0.06
Interest Rate (%) 0.43 0.43 0.43
Labor Market
Participation (pp) -0.06 -0.03 -0.02
Hours Worked (%) -0.07 -0.03 -0.01
Unemployment (pp) 0.09 0.05 0.02
Gross Wage Rate (%) -0.07 -0.16 -0.10
Net Wage Rate (%) -0.86 -0.34 -0.16
Public Finance
Public Debt (%) - - -
Consumption Tax (pp) - - -
Worker Labor Tax (pp) 0.52 0.13 0.05
Legend: 7 = 7 years after reform start, Avg = yearly average changes over the medium run
(years 1 to 25) in percentage, Spill % = average GDP spillover in percentage, equal to yearly
average change of GDP in ES (resp. PL) over yearly average change of GDP in DE. See table
1 for more.
Table 2: Large and temporary public spending increase in Germany with constant public debt
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Outcomes of second reform (large temporary government spending increase)
Table 2 provides economic impacts of a large but temporary government spending in-
crease in Germany, where public debt is kept constant with increases in labor income
taxes. Simulated impacts are provided for Germany (the reform country), Poland (where
spillovers are smallest) and Spain (where spillovers are largest). Detailed outcomes two
years after the end of the spending increase (in period 7) are provided, as well as the
average output variation over the medium run (in column Avg), arbitrarily defined as a
25 years time horizon17.
The table shows that output spillovers can be sizable, as the average output loss
in Spain (-0.14% per year) is almost a quarter of the average output loss in Germany
(-0.45%). The table also shows that the spillover varies across countries: while it is
almost 25% in Spain, it is only 10% in Poland. In the continuation we discuss the first
finding. The second finding will be investigated in subsection 3.2.
Integrated capital markets and capital-skill complementarity explain why spillovers
can be large. The intuition is as follows. The large public spending increase in Germany
(+2.5% of GDP during 5 years) is a drag on the capital market which crowds out private
investment in all countries (from -0.52% in Germany to -0.20% in Poland after seven
years), thus reducing the capital stock and output in all countries.
Capital-skill complementarity deepens output spillovers. Indeed, capital-skill com-
plementarity means that capital is more complementary to high-skilled labor in pro-
duction than to low-skilled labor. If capital is an important complement to the most
productive types of labor, the negative impact of capital scarcity on output is magni-
fied. This applies to the reform country (Germany) and any country integrated in the
same capital market (Poland and Spain). If there was no capital-skill complementarity
in production, the negative impact on output would be smaller, since capital would be
equally complementary across all types of labor.
Another factor, standard, contributes to the negative impact on output, namely
distortive taxation. To keep public debt constant with a decrease in capital and thus
wage rates, the labor income tax rate needs to be increased, which depresses labor supply
and further drags output down. Note however that this factor was also operating in the
case of the first reform (20% cut in labor income taxes in Germany, financed by larger
consumption taxes). Alone however, this factor did not lead to large spillovers: the
domestic increase in savings was sufficient to absorb most of the additional demand on
the integrated capital market (as shown for instance by the smaller interest rate variation
in table 1 than in table 2).
3.2 Cross-country differences in spillovers
Table 2 shows that the average yearly output loss over the medium run is 0.14% in
Spain and 0.06% in Poland when Germany makes a large but temporary increase in
government spending, Germany itself losing an average yearly 0.59% of output. We
17If we were to discount future output variations, we would implicitly use a social welfare function
which puts higher weight on current generations and lower weight on future generations. We choose to
remain neutral and apply no discounting.
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Sources: OECD Education at a Glance; OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) database (average 2001-2007); *:estimate
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Figure 2: Initial education and capital stock characteristics
investigate the reasons for differences in the size of spillover across countries and show
that production inputs and production structure play a key role, including capital-skill
complementarity.
Figure 2 provides a view of key production inputs for the 14 countries in our scope.
One can observe that Poland and Spain lie at opposite extremes: Poland has one of the
smallest capital stock (as fraction of GDP) and one of the smallest amount of skilled
households (educated at ISCED 5-8 levels), while Spain has one of the largest amount
of capital stock and skilled households.
In the initial equilibrium, the outcome of calibration is a larger weight on capital and
skilled labor inputs into production, leading to a larger degree of capital-skill comple-
mentarity, in Spain. Recall indeed that production parameters, which define the degree
of capital-skill complementarity, are calibrated to match output, the marginal product
of capital and other production targets, taking production inputs from the data. All
of these parameters and values are country-specific. However, in an integrated capital
market the interest rate and thus the marginal product of capital are identical across
countries. The production weights on skilled labor and capital are therefore largest in
countries where the supply of these production factors are largest18.
As discussed at the end of subsection 3.1, capital-skill complementarity tends to
amplify the magnitude of spillovers: the public spending increase in Germany draws
resources from the integrated capital market, reducing investment and thus capital and
output in all countries, an effect which is magnified when capital is complementary to
skilled labor in production. The degree of capital-skill complementarity being larger in
Spain, and smaller in Poland, the spending increase in Germany has largest effects in
Spain and smallest in Poland.
To further investigate the contribution of production inputs and production structure
in spillovers, we perform a quantitative decomposition analysis. We consider counter-
factual calibration scenarios in Spain and Poland, leaving calibration of other countries
18Semi-formally, consider the simpler case of Cobb-Douglas production Yj = K
αj
j (AL)
1−αj for dif-
ferent countries j ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} with identical labor inputs and labor-augmenting technologies, but
different capital supplies Kj and capital contributions αj . An identical marginal product of capital
αj (AL/Kj)
1−αj means that the largest capital contribution αj comes for the country with largest
capital Kj .
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unchanged. The same government spending reforms in Germany as in subsection 3.1 is
then applied and leads to spillovers which are compared with the baseline case.
ES and PL calibration case
GDP Spillover (%)
EU Avg ES PL
0 Baseline calibration 14.7 24.4 10.0
I Skill distribution as in DE 14.8 25.0 10.0
II Initial capital stock as in DE 14.7 20.7 11.1
III Production function: parameters gap with DE cut in 2 ... ... ...
IV I + II + III 12.4 12.4 10.0
Legend: GDP Spillover (%) = yearly average change of GDP in ES (resp. EU Avg, PL)
over yearly average change of GDP in DE over the medium run (years 1 to 25), EU Avg =
average for all 14 EU countries except DE. Calibration of other countries than ES and PL
remains unchanged. The reform is the same as in table 2, a large public spending increase in
Germany with constant public debt.
Table 3: Large and temporary public spending increase in Germany: decomposition analysis
Table 3 provides an overview of the decomposition and the results. Several produc-
tion calibration scenarios are considered and illustrate the role of the various production
components in spillovers size.
Case 0 represents the baseline calibration scenario, where production parameters are
outcomes of actual empirical observations. As in table 2, the output spillovers are 24.4%
for Spain and 10.0% for Poland. The average spillover size over all countries (except
Germany) is 14.7%.
Case I assumes that the skill distribution in Spain and Poland is the same as in
Germany, according to the graph in the left of figure 2. The skill distribution of other
countries remains unchanged. When Germany then performs the same government
spending reform as in the baseline scenario, the spillover in Spain increases to 25.0%
and the average spillover to 14.8%, while it remains constant in Poland. Differences in
skilled labor inputs in production thus do not represent the main reason for differences
in spillover sizes.
Case II assumes that the capital stock in the initial equilibrium is the same in Spain
and Poland as in Germany (as % of GDP). After the spending reform in Germany, the
spillover in Spain decreases to 20.7% while the spillover in Poland increases to 11.1%.
Part of the differences in spillover sizes are thus due to differences in capital input into
production.
Case III changes the production function parameters in Spain and Poland. Specifi-
cally, the difference between the parameters in Spain (respectively Poland) and Germany
is reduced by 50%. This counterfactual change in production structure without change
in production inputs leads to unusual economic equilibrium, generating difficulties in
numerical solutions.
Case IV combines the changes in calibration in Spain and Poland that are applied
in cases I, II and III : the skill distribution and initial capital stock have the same values
as in Germany and the gap in production function parameters with German values is
cut in two. After the government spending increase in Germany, spillovers in Spain,
15
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Figure 3: Outcomes for Spain after spending increase in Germany, different calibrations
Poland and other countries change: the output spillover in Spain now equals the average
spillover among all countries (at 12.4%) while the gap between the spillover in Poland
and all other countries is reduced, compared to the baseline (2.4 instead of 4.7 percentage
points).
The intuition is the following. Changes in production inputs and structure leads
to a lower capital-skill complementarity and lower demand for capital in Spain. The
resulting equilibrium interest rate, before and after the reform in Germany, is lower.
Investments are cheaper. Because the degree of capital-skill complementarity is reduced
in Spain, its magnifying effect on spillover is lower (as discussed at the end of subsection
3.1). Figure 3 illustrates the difference in interest rates, investments, capital stocks and
outputs between the baseline case and case IV after the reform. In particular, the figure
shows that the output loss is smaller in case IV (dotted line) than in the baseline (plain
line).
Two conclusions emerge from the decomposition analysis. First, differences in pro-
duction inputs and structure, including capital-skill complementarity differences, play
an important role in the difference in the size of fiscal policy spillovers. With identical
production inputs and 50% less differences in the production structure as in Germany,
output spillovers in Spain are no longer greater than in other countries, but equal to
the average spillover value. Second, these disparities in production inputs and structure
are not the only factors which leads to spillover size differences. The same counterfac-
tual transformation of production inputs and structure in Poland as in Spain leads to
spillovers in Poland which are closer, but not equal to spillovers in other countries: they
remain smaller than average19.
19This second conclusion also motivates the partial, rather than full, removal of production structure
differences with Germany in cases III and IV : the gap in production parameters is not removed 100%,
but only 50%.
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3.3 Summary of findings
This subsection consolidates findings from the quantitative analysis and then summarizes
key mechanisms at work.
Finding 1. The cross-country spillovers of a standard labor income tax are small: when
Germany cuts its labor income tax rate 20% and increases its consumption taxes to keep
public debt constant, the largest output gain in other countries amounts to 2.5% of the
output gain in Germany.
Finding 2. The cross-country spillovers of a large and temporary government spending
increase can be sizable: when Germany increases its public spending 2.5% of GDP during
5 years and keeps its public debt constant with higher labor income taxes, the largest
average yearly output loss over the next 25 years in other countries amounts to 24.4%
of the average yearly loss in Germany.
Finding 3. The size of cross-country spillovers varies across countries: the German
reform in Finding 2 leads to output losses in other countries which range from 10.0% to
24.4% of the output loss in Germany.
Spillovers in the first finding are due to the integration of the capital market. The
labor tax cut and consumption tax hike stimulates labor supply and output in Germany,
but drops aggregate consumption. On impact, Germany increases savings and fuels the
capital market. Other countries can invest more.
Together with the integrated capital market, capital-skill complementarity explains
the second and third findings. The large public spending hike in Germany crowds out
private investment in all countries. The capital stock drops, reducing output. The
output drop is magnified by capital-skill complementarity, as the contribution of the
most productive type of labor to production is reduced with the capital drop. Countries
where production exhibits a large degree of capital-skill complementarity suffer more
than others.
4 Policy implications
We use the model to investigate the effect of debt management rules, which may be
defined at the country level or come from a fiscal policy coordination framework. We
then derive policy implications for fiscal policy coordination.
4.1 Alternative public debt management rules
Section 3 showed that cross-country fiscal policy spillovers can be small or large, for
realistic reform scenarios. All cases that were considered assumed that public debt was
to remain constant at all times, for internal or external policy reasons. In this section
we consider alternative public debt management rules for the reform which generate
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Figure 4: Public spending increase: stylized representation of alternative fiscal policy responses
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Figure 5: Germany output following public spending increase, alternative debt treatments
the larger spillovers, a large a temporary increase in government spending in Germany
(+2.5% of GDP over five years) with labor income tax variations to match public debt
targets.
In the previous section, the target was a constant public debt. Here, we assume that
public debt may temporarily increase, up to 12.5% of its current value, but that it has
to be back to its original level after 25 years. While the first policy response leads to a
large but short-lived increase of labor income taxes, the second response leads to a mild
but prolonged increase of the taxes. Figure 4 illustrates the difference between the two
policy responses.
Results of the simulations, which compare the impact of the two policy responses
over time, are presented in figure 5 and table 4.
The figure provides the output path in Germany over the long-run. It shows that
the output loss is larger when debt is not allowed to increase (policy response 1; dotted
line) than when the debt can increase (policy response 2; plain line) but that peak in
the loss lasts fewer years. This result is not surprising, as the output loss mimics the
variation in labor income taxes (recall figure 4). The figure however does not allow to
see which of the two policy responses is the most damaging for output on average. The
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answer appears in table 4.
DE ES PL
7 Avg 7 Avg Spill % 7 Avg Spill %
Panel A. Policy Response 1: no increase in public debt
Macroeconomics
GDP (%) -0.45 -0.59 -0.20 -0.14 24.4 -0.09 -0.06 10.0
Capital Stock (%) -0.52 -0.33 -0.20
Interest Rate (%) 0.43 0.43 0.43
Public Finance
Public Debt (%) - - -
Consumption Tax (pp) - - -
Worker Labor Tax (pp) 0.52 0.13 0.05
Panel B. Policy Response 2: temporary increase in public debt
Macroeconomics
GDP (%) -0.58 -0.54 -0.16 -0.12 22.1 -0.07 -0.05 9.2
Capital Stock (%) -0.46 -0.25 -0.16
Interest Rate (%) 0.30 0.30 0.30
Public Finance
Public Debt (%) 11.83 - -
Consumption Tax (pp) - - -
Worker Labor Tax (pp) 1.39 0.12 0.04
Legend: see table 2.
Table 4: Large and temporary public spending increase in Germany, alternative debt treatments
The table provides selected macroeconomic and public finance outcomes in Germany,
Spain and Poland for the two reforms. Panel A displays the impact of the first policy
response, where public debt is kept constant. The information is the same as in table 2
and repeated for convenience. Panel B provides the impact of the second policy response,
where public debt is temporarily allowed to increase20.
The table shows that the average yearly output loss in Germany is larger when public
debt is kept constant (-0.59% versus -0.54%). There are two reasons for such a result.
First, the disruptive effect of taxation increases in an over-proportional manner with the
level of taxes, as disutility of labor increases in a convex fashion; although labor income
taxes are increased for a shorter amount of time when public debt is kept constant, the
increase leads to an over-proportional damage. Second, the spending shock is smoothed
across countries with the fiscal policy that keeps debt constant, while it is smoothed
across countries and across time with the policy that allows debt to grow temporarily.
The combination of international and intertemporal smoothing is more efficient.
Table 4 also shows that the negative output impacts outside Germany are larger with
a constant German public debt than with a temporary debt increase (Spain: -0.14% vs
-0.12%; Poland: -10.0% versus -9.2%). In relative terms, the benefits of a larger public
20Appendix C provides for Panel B the information which table 2 provides for Panel A.
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debt are even larger in the foreign countries than in the reform country (Germany: 8.1%
gain; Spain: 16.7% gain; Poland: 15.2% gain).
Moreover, the negative spillovers are larger with a constant debt, both in Spain
(24.4% vs 22.1%) and in Poland (10.0% vs 9.2%). Because output drops more with a
constant debt policy, the need for Germany to draw on foreign resources to finance the
public spending hike is larger, increasing the drag on the international capital market
(as can be seen in the interest rate, increasing 0.43% vs 0.30% in period 7), which crowds
out private investments in all countries to a larger extent.
4.2 Implications for public debt coordination rules
The European Union expects its members to meet a number of fiscal policy targets. In
particular, public debt should not exceed 60% of GDP. Drawing from our quantitative
analysis, we discuss this fiscal policy coordination target. We argue that there can
be benefits for each members of the EU if this debt ceiling rule was relaxed in some
circumstances and under certain conditions, even if only one member is facing economic
challenges.
The previous subsection showed that the disruptive effects of a large and temporary
public spending increase are smaller if public debt is temporarily allowed to increase.
The public spending increase that was considered is large (2.5% of GDP during 5 years)
but, in exceptional circumstances, realistic: public transfers to the financial sector fol-
lowing the 2007 subprime crisis amounted to 10.8% of GDP in Germany (International
Monetary Fund, 2013).
Several factors can explain the high levels of public debt that can be seen in many
developed countries. Unsound economic policy may be one factor. Bad luck is another
one. Countries which have repeatedly been hit by adverse shocks and have reached
the EU debt ceiling, if hit again by another shock, no longer have the room for a
temporary increase of public debt. Yet, the temporary increase in public debt allows
to reduce economic distortions, which can ease public debt management. Over time,
countries with bad luck may end up in growingly weaker economic positions because of
coordination rules themselves, rather than their own economic policy (vicious circle).
The EU fiscal rules may thus benefit from an adjustment, seeking to differentiate
choice (unsound public finance management) from chance (external negative shock).
The previous subsection also showed that all countries can benefit from rules which
allow a temporary debt increase, not only the country hit by the shock. In fact, the
benefits may even be larger for the countries not hit by the shock. In the scenario we
considered, the output losses are reduced about twice as much in the shock-free countries
as in the country hit by the shock, if that country alone can temporarily increase public
debt (Germany, hit by the shock: 8.1% gain; Poland, shock-free country with smallest
gains: 15.2% gain).
To sum up, if rules or procedures allow to separate choice from chance, allowing
a country hit by an adverse shock to increase its public debt beyond the debt ceiling
target in a temporary fashion would not only benefit the country hit by the shock itself,
but all other shock-free countries too. Shock-free countries may even benefit more from
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these alternative public debt coordination rules. Such a conditional debt-ceiling relaxing
rule makes efficiency gains because the overall tax distortion is reduced and because the
shock on capital markets is smoothed not only across countries, but also across time.
5 Conclusion
We build a multi-country overlapping-generations model with an integrated capital mar-
ket in a currency union and calibrate it to cover 14 countries, together covering above
80% of the population of the European Union. Consistent with empirical evidence,
we assume that production exhibits capital-skill complementarity. We show that this
feature amplifies cross-country spillovers.
In a realistic but large public spending increase scenario, we find for instance that
output losses in shock-free countries can amount to a quarter of the loss in the country hit
by the shock. Because an increase in public spending crowds out private investments and
capital markets are integrated, reform-free countries also experience a decrease in capital
stock and output. Capital-skill complementarity deepens output spillovers, because the
reduction in capital decreases the contribution of the most productive type of labor.
Different production structures, and thus degrees of capital-skill complementarity,
lead to differences in the size of output spillovers across countries. We find that the
smallest spillover is 10% (Poland) and the largest 25% (Spain) for the same reform (in
Germany).
It is worth stressing out that the only channel for these large output spillovers is
the freedom for investors to invest anywhere. A constraint on monetary policy, such as
the Zero Lower Bound, is not needed to generate larger spillovers. Our results however
remain compatible with earlier findings from the literature and provide a complementary
view, highlighting the importance of capital use in production.
Comparing fiscal rules, we show that temporary increases in public debt can reduce
the output losses not only in countries which experience a detrimental increase in public
debt, but also in other countries. Under certain circumstances and conditions, the
European Union may thus benefit from relaxing its 60%-of-GDP debt ceiling rule.
This paper focused on spillovers, considering only a few fiscal policy coordination
alternatives. Gains from alternative fiscal policy coordination have been identified, but
remain quantitatively small. A more complete investigation of the potential of fiscal
policy coordination is left for future research.
The literature generally finds that cross-country spillovers are small when mone-
tary policy operates freely, and larger when the ZLB is binding. Future research could
also investigate whether spillovers are even larger when both the ZLB and capital-skill
complementarity operate.
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A Appendix: calibration details
This appendix communicates details on the calibration of the two stylized Rest-of-the-
world countries, NROW and SROW, respectively aggregates of Canada, Japan, the USA
and Brazil, China and India. First, demographic and macroeconomic level data sources
are provided, then details on the twinning process (as described in subsection 2.3) and
finally calibration outcomes.
Demographic and macro-level data: Table 5 summarizes the variables and data
sources at the demographic and macroeconomic levels which are used in the calibration
process.
Calibration input Data Source Key Indicator
Survival Probabilities UN Population Division Total population, by five-year
age group
Skill Distribution OECD Highest adult education level
attained
Gross Domestic Product Worldbank GDP at market prices (USD)
Capital Stock World Input-Output
Database
Real fixed capital stock
(K_GFCF)
Depreciation Rate of Capital Penn World Table Average depreciation rate
(delta)
Trade Balance Worldbank Current Account Balance
Gross Government Debt OECD Gross General Gov. Debt
Public Health Expenditures Worldbank Health Expenditures, Public
Public Pension Expenditures Worldbank Total Public Pension Spending
Gov. Revenue Tax Shares OECD National Accounts / Taxes and
Social Contribution Receipts
and Government Expenditures
by Function
Table 5: Demographic and macroeconomic data sources
Twinning process: because micro-level data is needed for calibration of age- and skill-
dependent labor market and public policy parameters, but unavailable on a consistent
basis for the six countries composing the Rest-of-the-world countries, we identify for
each of these six countries a twin country (or a set of twin countries). A twin country
is a European country who belongs to our calibration scope. We then use micro-level
data from the twin country for the calibration of the Rest-of-the-world countries. In the
continuation we provide details on the selection of the twin countries.
Tables 6 and 7 present the demographic, policy and economic indicators which are
used for choosing the twin countries.
We eliminate the eastern European countries as potential twin country for the North
Rest-of-the-world (NROW) region as these countries have a lower economic development
(GDP/Capita). Furthermore we eliminate Spain from the potential candidates because
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of large differences in unemployment rates. From the remaining countries the UK dis-
plays the closest values across all indicators. Hence Canada, Japan and the USA take
UK as a twin country for calibration purposes.
The eastern European countries in our scope are the closest to SROW countries in
terms of GDP/Capita, dependency ratio, share of people with tertiary education and
overall indicators for the social security system. Thus the twin country for Brazil, China
and India is an equally weighted combination of Czech Republic, Poland and Slovak
Republic.
Indicator AT BE CZ DEN ESP FIN FRA GER ITA NL
GDP 383 463 306 247 1526 217 2484 3516 2126 783
GDP/Capita 45.4 41.9 29.1 44.2 32.7 40.1 37.9 43.7 35.2 46.8
Growth 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.5 -0.8 0.5 1.0 2.1 -0.5 0.5
Consumption 54 52 49 48 58 54 56 55 61 45
Population 8.4 11.0 10.5 5.6 46.6 5.4 63.2 81.0 59.7 16.7
Labor Force 67.0 65.0 68.0 64.0 67.0 64.0 63.0 66.0 64.0 66.0
Old-Age Dep. 27.7 27.7 25.9 28.7 27.7 31.0 29.7 31.9 34.3 27.0
SG2 62.9 36.6 74.1 42.8 22.1 44.9 42.0 58.6 40.9 40.7
SG3 19.7 34.8 18.1 33.9 31.8 39.0 30.1 27.4 15.2 32.7
Participation 76.0 67.7 73.3 78.2 74.4 75.8 71.0 77.4 64.2 79.5
Unemployment 5.0 8.5 6.2 6.6 24.7 8.6 9.9 5.0 12.5 6.9
Work Hours 35.5 33.8 39.9 31.5 35.1 36.0 37.1 39.1 35.7 29.9
Ret. Age M 65 60 63 65 65 65 61 65 63 65
Ret. Age W 60 60 61 65 65 65 61 65 62 65
Gini on Income 30 29 26 28 35 28 32 32 34 29
Tax Ratio 48 49 39 55 37 53 50 44 46 46
Public Debt 86 106 41 40 101 63 96 72 133 67
Pension Exp. 11.8 9.8 9.2 5.8 8.2 9.1 13.3 10.6 14.9 5.0
Health Exp. 8.4 8.2 6.2 9.3 6.8 6.8 9.0 8.7 7.2 9.9
Education Exp. 5.5 6.3 4.0 8.2 4.6 6.4 5.6 4.7 4.3 5.4
UI Exp. 1.30 3.71 0.28 4.38 3.64 3.55 0.00 2.94 0.31 2.60
UI Rep. Rate 0.31 0.40 0.06 0.57 0.35 0.36 0.39 0.27 0.24 0.50
Legend: GDP = GDP in Billion USD, GDP/Capita = GDP per capita divided by 1.000,
Growth = GDP growth in %, Consumption = Consumption in % GDP, Population =
population in million persons, Labor Force = % of population aged 15-64, Old-Age Dep =
Old-age dependency ratio, SG2 = % of labor force with upper secondary education, SG3
= % of labor force with tertiary education, Participation = participation rate in % of labor
force, Unemployment = unemployment rate in % of labor force, Work Hours = average
weakly work hours, Ret Age M (W) = statutory retirement age for men (women), Gini on
Income = Gini coefficient on labor income measuring wage inequality in %, Tax Ratio =
tax and social security contribution revenues in % GDP, Public Debt = debt in % GDP,
Pension Exp = expenditures in % GDP, Health Exp. = expenditures in % GDP, Education
Exp = expenditures in % GDP, UI Exp = expenditures on unemployment insurance in %
GDP, UI Rep. Rate = unemployment insurance replacement rate
Table 6: Economic Indicators for the twin country approach (start)
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Indicator PL SVK SWE UK USA CAN JPN CHN BRA IND
GDP 888 142 420 2413 16130 1482 4517 15177 2661 4069
GDP/Capita 23.1 26.3 44.1 37.9 51.3 42.6 35.4 11.2 13.7 3.6
Growth 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.5 1.5 8.6 3.2 7.2
Consumption 61 57 46 65 68 56 60 37 60 58
Population 38.4 5.4 9.5 62.4 319 35.5 127 1364 206 1295
Labor Force 70.0 71.0 63.0 65.0 67.0 68.0 61.0 74.0 69.0 65.0
Old-Age Dep. 21.4 18.8 31.0 27.0 21.6 23.0 41.9 12.5 11.0 8.4
SG2 65.6 73.2 52.0 37.1 46.7 37.2 54.2 18.7 31.5 38.9
SG3 23.4 18.1 35.0 39.5 42.5 51.4 45.8 3.6 12.3 12.6
Participation 67.3 70.2 81.3 76.4 71.8 78.2 75.1 77.6 75.0 56.5
Unemployment 9.2 13.3 8.0 6.3 6.2 6.9 3.7 4.7 6.8 3.6
Work Hours 39.8 34.7 36.3 39.5 33.8 30.9 42.4 46.5 41.8 47.0
Ret. Age M 65 62 65 65 66 65 65 60 55 58
Ret. Age W 60 62 65 63 66 65 65 60 55 58
Gini on Income 34 27 27 34 41 34 32 42 54 34
Tax Ratio 39 35 53 40 32 39 31 20 36 20
Public Debt 51 52 44 89 103 87 229 41 66 66
Pension Exp. 11.9 8.4 8.2 5.0 6.8 4.5 10.1 2.5 6.1 1.0
Health Exp. 4.8 5.7 7.8 7.7 8.1 7.7 8.3 2.9 4.4 1.2
Education Exp. 5.0 3.9 6.5 5.5 5.3 5.0 3.7 3.3 5.7 3.6
UI Exp. 1.99 1.02 2.91 0.28 0.42 2.23 0.41 0.02 2.03 0.01
UI Rep. Rate 0.11 0.11 0.32 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.02 * 0.06
Legend: see table 6.
Table 7: Economic Indicators for the twin country approach (end)
Calibration outcomes: Table 8 provides selected results of the calibration process
for the stylized Rest-of-the-world countries, showing a reasonable match between model
outcomes and data.
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NROW SROW
Calibration Data Calibration Data
Macroeconomics
Capital/GDP 2.81 2.82 3.17 3.18
Consumption/GDP 0.57 0.66 0.42 0.44
Investment/GDP 0.24 0.21 0.42 0.39
Participation Rate (%) 69.9 73.10 68.26 68.50
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.65 5.64 4.39 4.39
Government
Public Debt (% GDP) 117.64 127.64 43.23 48.82
Tax Ratio (% GDP) 30.91 32.38 21.25 22.23
Pension Expenditures (% GDP) 7.32 7.32 3.32 2.66
Health Expenditures (% GDP) 7.47 8.08 2.73 2.79
UI Expenditures (% GDP) 0.50 0.54 0.02 0.03*
Demographics
Old-Age Dependency Ratio 27.2 26.71 12.34 10.65
Education
Low-Skilled (% pop.) 7.96 8.02 63.17 62.95
Medium-Skilled (% pop.) 48.04 47.99 28.62 28.77
High-Skilled (% pop.) 44.00 43.99 8.21 8.28
Notes: Tax Ratio = tax and social security contribution revenues in % GDP, UI
Expenditures = Unemployment Insurance expenditures in % GDP, * Brazilian data is
lacking for SROW.
Table 8: Calibration outcomes for the stylized ROW countries
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B Appendix: output spillovers for all countries
Labor Tax Govt Spending Govt Spending
Cut Increase, Const Increase, Variable
Germany Public Debt Public Debt
Germany Germany
GDP Spill (%) Avg GDP Spill (%) Avg GDP Spill (%)
Austria 0.004 1.0 -0.092 15.5 -0.077 14.1
Belgium 0.003 0.7 -0.074 12.5 -0.063 11.7
Czech Republic* 0.004 1.0 -0.087 14.8 -0.072 13.3
Denmark 0.004 0.9 -0.091 15.3 -0.078 14.3
Finland 0.003 0.7 -0.073 12.3 -0.063 11.6
France 0.003 0.7 -0.087 14.7 -0.075 13.8
Germany 0.431 - -0.591 - -0.543 -
Italy 0.006 1.5 -0.111 18.7 -0.092 16.9
Netherlands 0.004 1.0 -0.091 15.4 -0.078 14.3
Poland* 0.002 0.5 -0.059 10.0 -0.050 9.3
Slovakia 0.005 1.2 -0.094 15.9 -0.076 14.0
Spain 0.008 1.9 -0.144 24.4 -0.120 22.1
Sweden* 0.003 0.6 -0.067 11.3 -0.058 10.8
UK* 0.002 0.4 -0.063 10.6 -0.054 10.0
Legend: * = countries with independent currency from the Euro; GDP = GDP variation in
the final steady state in percentage, after the reform; Avg GDP = yearly average changes
over the medium run (years 1 to 25) in percentage, Spill (%) = GDP changes compared to
GDP changes in Germany; for details on reforms, see subsections 3.1 and 4.1.
Table 9: Output spillovers: overview for all countries and simulations
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C Appendix: additional details on simulations
DE ES PL
7 Avg 7 Avg Spill % 7 Avg Spill %
Macroeconomics
GDP (%) -0.58 -0.54 -0.16 -0.12 22.1 -0.07 -0.05 9.2
Investment (%) -1.18 -0.14 -0.03
Capital Stock (%) -0.46 -0.25 -0.16
Consumption (%) -1.32 -0.11 -0.05
Trade Balance (%) 0.41 -0.07 -0.04
Interest Rate (%) 0.30 0.30 0.30
Labor Market
Participation (pp) -0.13 -0.03 -0.01
Hours Worked (%) -0.15 -0.02 -0.01
Unemployment (pp) 0.18 0.04 0.01
Gross Wage Rate (%) 0.25 -0.12 -0.08
Net Wage Rate (%) -1.89 -0.28 -0.13
Public Finance
Public Debt (%) 11.83 - -
Consumption Tax (pp) - - -
Worker Labor Tax (pp) 1.39 0.12 0.04
Legend: see table 2.
Table 10: Large and temporary public spending increase in Germany, temporary debt increase
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